| Surprisingly, in terms of timing and not content, US President Donald Trump announced a ‘peace’ agreement had been reached between Abu Dhabi and Tel Aviv, which would provide for the normalisation of relations between the two parties. His son-in-law, Jared Kushner, while boasting about this historic achievement, confirmed work on a deal had been underway for over 18 months to reach this ‘historic’ moment. Even Trump jokingly said he would have liked to have put his name on this deal, but knew the media would not accept this. In the midst of celebrations in the three capitals over the deal, Israeli officials came out to deny claims the agreement was reached after an Israeli concession on annexing the West Bank and Israel showered the besieged Gaza Strip with a barrage of missiles to prove its point, It also announced the execution of a prison sentence for Sheikh Raed Salah, showing this agreement has no benefit for Palestinian landowners and emphasising any gains for the Palestinian cause were an illusion, even if temporary. The Emirati normalisation of relations is in itself not surprising. First, Abu Dhabi has had warm relations with Israel for years since their cooperation in the assassination of Mahmoud Al Mabhouh. This was expressed through delegations, exchange of visits and consensus on a number of regional issues and support for ‘the deal of the century’. Second, this agreement – although it is exceptional in terms of its comprehensiveness – is not the first Gulf normalisation case. With the exception of Kuwait, all Gulf states have contacts with Israel either with the aim of achieving gains with Washington or in the context of dealing with the Palestinian issue. With the increase in American pressure, the continuation of Arab disputes and the decline in priority of the Palestinian issue for various reasons, this pace of normalisation will accelerate across the Arab world and the Gulf. Countries are scrambling toward normalisation and it seems they will now have an opportunity. At the political level, Abu Dhabi offered a strategic concession in favour of perceived and tactical gains. The decision-maker in Abu Dhabi imagines this position would help him score points with the Trump administration, which is frustrated by the failure of the deal of the century and the failure of Abu Dhabi and Riyadh to pressure the Palestinians and others to accept it. Through the deal, perhaps the Trump administration would ease pressure on them on various issues. It would help Abu Dhabi to obtain a final green light from Trump before the next election to achieve certain goals in the Emirati agenda. At another level, this agreement is seen as a safety valve for a change of the American administration, as any incoming administration, regardless of its political affiliation, would have difficulty ignoring the agreement. This would give Abu Dhabi a competitive advantage and could really happen in the short term. Ultimately, the competitive advantage would fade quickly, so Israel and Washington would return to practising their usual pressure games in the region. As for relying on the Trump administration, it has previously proven to be useless at various junctures. This is a reckless administration in its foreign relations and is unable to offer real advantages to its allies, nor can it truly confront its opponents. Countries which normalised relations with Israel earlier did not make any gains in their regional roles. On the contrary, these regimes saw their roles considerably diminished despite their persistence in serving the goals of the Zionist entity. They did not get any protection from Washington when the winds of change blew in. In addition to the approaching US election, there seems to be another motive behind the timing of the deal, which is the reduced role of Riyadh, Abu Dhabi’s biggest ally. The regime has received an increasing number of blows internationally, the most recent of which is the Saad Al Jabri case and its repercussions in Washington. Riyadh appears to be in a state of political and diplomatic paralysis that makes it unable to deal with common issues it shares with Abu Dhabi like Yemen and Libya and in managing the relationship with Trump.Accordingly, it seems Abu Dhabi’s next option is for Israel to be the strategic ally on the table and not under it. But a simple reading of Israeli reactions clearly indicates the enthusiasm for this deal is not shared by the public, but rather confined to Benjamin Netanyahu and his team. In fact, many Zionist analysts see them as the sole beneficiary. In Israel, some say Netanyahu made an unnecessary concession by delaying the annexation of settlements and he came out stressing this agreement comes within the framework of peace in lieu of force. He has said the option of annexation very much exists and the delay is due to a lack of American support and not due to the agreement with the UAE. This agreement would now be clubbed in history with those which produced only more occupation and an expansion of Israeli arrogance, and if it had any Arab benefit, it lies in unifying the Palestinian discourse and bringing the burning issue back to the table within the framework of opposing the agreement and denouncing it. There is no doubt it will be disappointing and it is not only a result of this agreement, but rather a result of the state of Arab fragmentation in general. Israel was never stronger or bigger, but it has climbed the ladder of Arab disputes and will continue to rise as long as these disputes persist and these functional systems exist in the region. |
Peace between allies: Reading between the lines of the UAE-Israel deal
With the exception of Kuwait, all Gulf states have contacts with Israel.
