The events of the new wave of the Arab Spring are progressing and becoming more complicated with the complex conflict in Sudan, the continued fluidity of the situation in Algeria and the failure of Khalifa Haftar to achieve field progress on the ground in Libya. The situation in all the three countries does not make them appear to be candidates for stability. In the case of Algeria and Sudan, it seems the confrontation within the regime camps is more intense than the conflict with the forces outside it. In the midst of all this, the Gulf countries are watching, considering they had a very prominent role in the events of the first spring, or at least in complicating the scene, at that time.
As was the case with the Egyptian revolution and the war in Libya the first time, the Gulf axis seems to be clearly divided on the events in the three countries today, too, but there are different factors now that determine the nature of the Gulf intervention. First, the Gulf countries, whatever their positions in supporting one side or the other, seem to be exhausted by the Arab political state and the successive crises.
The Saudi-Emirati axis, which invested a great deal in ensuring the success of the counter-revolutions, is facing today a failure in their efforts in Yemen and also facing economic challenges resulting from the bleeding caused by their reckless acts. Qatar, for its part, has become more cautious in its external political activity, especially with the current US administration, whose reactions are not as expected due to the experience of the previous spring and the siege.
Moreover, the lines are not clear in the countries facing revolutions. The differences in the military in Sudan make it difficult for the Saudi-UAE axis to determine the direction of their support. The attitude of Omar Al Bashir rejecting the siege of Qatar and his reconciliation with Turkey made these two countries take a step back after he was removed. As the situation became more complex, the question was whether to support the popular movement or support the stability of the state. The Arab world is suffering a crisis as central governments are missing in their most important capitals.
In the case of Algeria, it is clear that the regimes, especially the military ones, do not accept outside interference from any party, which makes the Gulf countries keep a distance, although the Saudi-Emirati axis is trying to make inroads. Here and there, there are attempts to penetrate the Algerian situation, but do not appear to be realistic in light of the apparent differences in the role of the military and the nature of the governing institutions there.
In Libya, the lines of battle seem clearer. The Gulf support for opposing sides has been clear since the first day of Haftar’s move. The possibility of international consensus and the second wave of Arab spring has left the Saudi-Emirati axis firmly behind its only choice in Libya – Haftar – and they are doing everything to help him topple the internationally supported government in Tripoli. This includes huge and unlimited financial and military support for Haftar, media support and also political support, which has reached the point of persuading and convincing the White House to violate the official position of the administration by contacting Haftar.
There seems to be no turning back for decision makers in Abu Dhabi and Riyadh on the issue of Libya. On the other hand, the positions of Qatar, Turkey and Italy are clear and unambiguous in supporting the internationally recognised government in Tripoli. In the event Haftar fails to enter the capital, he will find no real supporters outside Abu Dhabi and Riyadh. If he does so, the world will recognise him quickly. And a new military ruler will be born.
Gulf capitals today, despite internal developments and crises, still represent the largest Arab bloc in terms of their stability and ability to influence events, but this is not necessarily positive. The anti-revolutions supported by the UAE and Saudi Arabia are still the most important factor in the instability of Middle East region. On the hand, Qatar’s caution gives more space to this axis to spread their chaos. At the same time, Qatar options are limited in the current Arab situation, but what is important here is that what happens in these three countries will have a significant impact on the balance of power between the two Arab axes in the Gulf.
The failure of Haftar or the success of the movements in Algeria and Sudan in the formation of civil governments will undoubtedly weaken the Saudi-Emirati axis supporting counter-revolution and will be a lever for popular enthusiasm for change. This will also mean further Arab repression and support for counter-revolutionary positions in stifling people’s aspirations by these countries.